Ethiopians can see how with its “intervention” in eastern Libya and Sudan, and most importantly in Gaza, Egypt’s action faltered even after speaking with a loud voice.
Formal meetings are another reminder of what Egypt intended from its “intervention” in Somalia: merely posturing.
To what extent can we say that Egypt has arrived late in Somalia? That depends really on whether this arrival was a serious move and just mere posturing. There is no doubt that the Somali authorities, torn between managing the territory under their control, dealing with the pressures of the Al-Shabaab extremist group and coping with the current regional challenges, will find some solace in the new momentum of their relationship with Egypt. But Somalis know, based on how Cairo’s links with eastern Libya and the Sudanese army have fared, that Egypt is manoeuvring in order to pressure Ethiopia, and that it is not reconfiguring the extent of its vital sphere of influence to include Somalia, bearing in mind its proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea.
A lot of attention was undoubtedly given to the recent meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his Somali counterpart Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, and also to what was leaked about the signing of a bilateral defence cooperation protocol. It remains to be seen whether the Egyptian forces and military equipment arriving in Somalia are now destined to be part of the peacekeeping forces of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) or are instead part of a unilateral Egyptian initiative, among other initiatives aiming to “encircle” Cairo’s Ethiopian rival geographically through defence cooperation protocols signed with the surrounding countries, especially those bordering the Nile River. What is clear however is that Egypt has finally realised that it is necessary to move and do something in its vital area.
Somalia has been divided since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre’s rule in 1991. Its national unity has been threatened since the day Somaliland declared its independence, as it distanced itself from the chaos of the civil war in Somalia. There is nothing new here that merits Egyptian attention at this point. What is new is the Ethiopian desire to reach the coast of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Addis Ababa wants to have economic and military access to the sea. Ethiopia is the most populous country in the world (120 million people) without a sea outlet.
Its access to the sea via Somaliland does not by itself worry Egypt. Cairo did not react to Turkey’s moves in Sudan and its signing there of the Suakin base agreement, nor when Ankara reached Somalia and infiltrated its political fabric in partnership with the Qataris. Somalia, until recently, seemed very far away. Geographically, it is actually further away than Yemen, from which Egypt sought to distance itself, until the Houthis decided to take Yemen to Egypt by restricting its major source of livelihood through an indirect blockade of the Suez Canal. The defence protocols signed with the countries surrounding Ethiopia have not before included Somalia, perhaps because Somalia is a crisis and not a country. But when the Ethiopians took the initiative and surprised the Egyptians by agreeing with Somaliland to lease a strip of the coast off the Gulf of Aden, Cairo saw in the move an opportunity to badger Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia had not previously paid attention to the security or defence agreements signed by Egypt with the surrounding countries, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Burundi. Its reactions were quite subdued. Ethiopia’s response this time was however strident. The Ethiopians’ anger seemed in part contrived. While the Somalis can understand easily that Cairo is not serious about its presence in the Horn of Africa, the Ethiopians can also look at the minutes of their negotiations with the Egyptians over the Renaissance Dam. They would be able to see how the Egyptians hinted at escalation while their state media even started talking about imminent revenge against Addis Ababa for operating the dam without Cairo’s prior agreement. These media warned that Egypt would not stand idly by while the Nile flow receded. Sources close to the authorities went as far as to talk about preparations for air strikes and sabotage operations targeting the dam, which were supposed to be carried out by Egyptian special forces. Then, nothing happened. There was total silence. Without looking back at these issues, Ethiopians can see how Egypt’s “interventions” in eastern Libya and Sudan, and most importantly in Gaza, have faltered even after initially speaking with a loud voice.
But the Ethiopians are clever enough to take advantage of the Egyptian “intervention” in Somalia. There are moderate voices in Ethiopia pressing for an understanding with the Egyptians. More than one regional and international power has tried to mediate between Cairo and Addis Ababa with the aim of reaching a settlement over the unresolved Nile dam issue. Now the Ethiopians are using the Egyptian-Somali military cooperation protocol to respond to their critics. According to the current Ethiopian narrative, Egypt wants to “prevent the historic opportunity that Somaliland has provided us to return to the sea after we were deprived of it since Eritrea’s independence in 1993.”
Djibouti’s providing the Ethiopians with an expanded alternative trade outlet to the sea has no bearing on Addis Ababa’s decision to take advantage of the opportunity for escalation. It is appointing an ambassador to Somaliland, deploying forces on the border with Somalia, and warning Mogadishu against seeking support from external powers. But it has also said through its foreign minister that the door to negotiations with Egypt is still open. Addis Ababa is not holding the stick by the middle, but is holding it at one end while waving the other as a warning that it wields power: the dam is on its land, it controls the flow of the Nile and until recently it has maintained some 10,000 soldiers in Somalia , while there are more on the border.
On the same day that Ethiopia made its threat, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly met his Somali counterpart Hamza Abdi Barre, to discuss bilateral ties and the “historical turning point” in relations, according to the Somali ambassador in Cairo. Such a meeting was a sign of weakness because Egypt was expected to carry out some sort of military or intelligence operation in Somalia. However, it cannot offer Somalia any form of civilian aid even though the financial and governmental situation in Somalia is well-known. The meeting was perhaps only intended for media consumption. Such formal encounters are another reminder of what Egypt meant by its “intervention” in Somalia: merely posturing.
The Somali authorities are facing a life-or-death battle with the terrorist movement Al-Shabaab, and it is unlikely that they will clash with Somaliland today in order to unify their country. Any Egyptian forces that arrive, regardless of whether they do so within an African peacekeeping mandate or as a special mission backing the government in Somalia, are not about to involve themselves in an internal conflict, let alone to take part in a confrontation with Ethiopia. Diplomatic sniping between Egypt and Ethiopia must take into account the balance of power between the two sides.
