Djibouti’s Interference in Somaliland’s Internal Affairs: Violations of International and Regional Principles
1. Background information:
The deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, signed in January 2024, has significantly shaken up the geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa region. According to reports, the agreement grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports, including the strategic port of Berbera, in exchange for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. This is a major development, as it reduces Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti’s ports, which have handled around 95% of Ethiopia’s trade.
The implications of this deal are far-reaching. Djibouti, which has long benefited economically from its position as Ethiopia’s main trade gateway, is now facing the prospect of losing a significant portion of that lucrative business. In response, reports indicate that Djibouti has been quietly training new recruits for its Republican Guard, allegedly with the intent of destabilizing Somaliland. Djibouti has denied any malicious intent towards its neighbor, but it is clear that the country is struggling to accept the new geopolitical realities brought about by the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement.
The deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia has the potential to further polarize the already volatile Horn of Africa region. Somalia, which considers Somaliland to be part of its territory, has strongly condemned the agreement and declared it “null and void” The dispute could potentially play into the hands of the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, which operates in Somalia, and further exacerbate regional tensions.
Overall, the Somaliland-Ethiopia deal has sent shockwaves through the Horn of Africa, reminiscent of the tensions sparked by Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to build a massive hydropower dam on the Blue Nile in 2011. [3] The region is now bracing for the potential fallout as the various powers jockey for influence and try to protect their interests in this strategically important part of the world.
2. Djibouti is working to undermine the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreement between Somalia and Somaliland.
Djibouti has taken a stance against Somaliland’s quest for independence and has aligned itself with Somalia in an effort to block the Somaliland-Ethiopia deal and undermine Somaliland’s control over the Awdal region. Djibouti has hosted meetings between the leader of the SSC-Khatumo group, which is pushing for independence from Somaliland, and the Somali President. This signals a coordinated effort by Djibouti and Somalia to destabilize Somaliland.
Furthermore, the document indicates that Djibouti has hosted meetings between the leader of the SSC-Khatumo group, which is pushing for independence from Somaliland, and the Somali President. This signals a coordinated effort by Djibouti and Somalia to destabilize Somaliland.
By aligning with Somalia and supporting groups opposed to Somaliland’s independence, Djibouti appears to be interfering in the internal affairs of Somaliland and challenging its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This goes against the principles of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of states that are enshrined in international law and the African Union Charter.
3. Djibouti is working to support some rebel groups by recruiting and training armed militias, in order to cause damage to Somaliland.
Djibouti has been accused of training Issa and Gadabursi clan rebels at a military base in Guestir, located about 50 km south of Ali-Sabieh. These rebel groups are reportedly being supported by Djibouti in order to create chaos and undermine Somaliland’s control over the Awdal region. Somaliland has condemned Djibouti’s actions as provocative and destabilizing.
The tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland stem from Somaliland’s recent deal with Ethiopia, which grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports, including Berbera. This deal has significant geopolitical implications and security considerations for the Horn of Africa region, as it eases Ethiopia’s landlocked trade and security constraints and secures maritime access. Djibouti, which has long been a key port for Ethiopia, appears to be envious of this deal and is trying to undermine it by supporting rebel groups and aligning with Somalia.
Djibouti’s actions are seen as a replay of Mogadishu’s genocide drive against Somaliland in the late 1980s, which failed. Somalilanders are not impressed by Djibouti’s so-called neutral stance, as they had played a significant role in supporting Djibouti’s struggle for independence from French colonial rule.
3. The key factors driving the ongoing tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland include:
Competition for Regional Influence:
Djibouti and Somaliland are both vying for greater influence and control in the Horn of Africa region.
Djibouti’s close ties with Somalia, Somaliland’s neighbor, are seen by Somaliland as a threat to its autonomy and aspirations for international recognition.
Both sides are competing for access to strategic resources and infrastructure, such as the Port of Berbera in Somaliland.
International Recognition:
Somaliland’s lack of international recognition as an independent state is a major point of contention with Djibouti, which recognizes Somalia’s federal government.
Djibouti’s support for Somalia’s claims over Somaliland is seen by the latter as undermining its aspirations for statehood and autonomy.
Economic Interests:
The control and development of key economic assets, such as the Port of Berbera, are a source of competition and tension between the two sides.
Djibouti views the Port of Berbera as a potential rival to its own strategic port infrastructure, which is a critical component of its economy.
Geopolitical Dynamics:
The broader geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, involving powers like Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, also contribute to the tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland.
These external actors have varying interests and alliances in the region, which can exacerbate the existing tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland.
The complexity of these factors, coupled with the historical grievances and competing national aspirations, have made it challenging to find a lasting resolution to the tensions between Djibouti and Somaliland.
4. Deteriorating Ethiopia-Djibouti Relations: Implications and Diplomatic Considerations
The relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti has deteriorated following the agreement signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Somaliland and Ethiopia signed an agreement where Ethiopia would gain access to the Red Sea through Somaliland, and Somaliland would receive economic and diplomatic benefits. Djibouti, in collaboration with the Federal Government of Somalia, opposed this agreement. Djibouti’s rejection has put pressure and tension on Ethiopia, as 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports pass through the port of Djibouti. This situation could pose a challenge to the lucrative trade agreement between the two countries, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
Potential economic and diplomatic implications if the tensions continue to escalate:
Economic Implications:
Disruption to the lucrative trade relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti, which relies heavily on Djibouti’s port infrastructure. This could significantly impact Ethiopia’s economy, as 95% of its imports and exports flow through Djibouti.
Increased costs and delays for Ethiopian goods moving through the port of Djibouti, reducing the competitiveness of Ethiopian exports.
Potential loss of Djibouti’s role as a key logistics and transportation hub for the Horn of Africa region, as Ethiopia may seek alternative port options.
Reduced foreign investment and economic cooperation between the two countries as the political tensions escalate.
Diplomatic Implications:
Deterioration of the historically strong diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Djibouti, which have been important regional allies.
Increased geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa, as Djibouti’s alignment with Somalia’s federal government could draw in other regional powers.
Djibouti may seek to strengthen ties with other countries, such as China, to balance against its dependence on Ethiopia.
Potential for the dispute to spill over into other areas of regional cooperation, such as security and counterterrorism efforts.
Damage to Djibouti’s reputation as a stable and reliable partner for international organizations and foreign investors.
Djibouti needs to be cautious and careful in its approach towards the powerful state of Ethiopia, with which it has a very strong relationship. Djibouti should re-evaluate its policy towards Ethiopia and avoid hardline stances and anger, which it has shown towards the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia. Djibouti, without displaying any hostility towards the Ethiopian government, should try to demonstrate a diplomatic approach that includes mutual interests between the two countries, Ethiopia and Djibouti. It is known that within the next 10 years and in the future, Ethiopia will be in need of the use of the crucial port of Djibouti.
Djibouti’s Interference in Somaliland’s Internal Affairs: Violations of International and Regional Principles
Based on the perspective of this document, the main ways in which Djibouti has interfered in the internal affairs of Somaliland and violated international and African principles are:
Support for rebel groups and militias in the Awdal region of Somaliland: According to the document, Djibouti has been accused of training Issa and Gadabursi rebels at a military base in Guestir, with the aim of creating chaos and undermining Somaliland’s control over the Awdal region. This is considered a direct interference in the internal affairs of Somaliland.
Alignment with Somalia to block the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia: The document indicates that Djibouti has hosted meetings between the leader of the SSC-Khatumo group, which is pushing for independence from Somaliland, and the Somali President. This signals a coordinated effort by Djibouti and Somalia to destabilize Somaliland.
Violation of the principle of non-interference: By supporting rebel groups and aligning with Somalia to block a sovereign agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, Djibouti would be violating the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, which is a fundamental principle of international law and the Charter of the African Union.
Challenge to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somaliland: By backing Somalia’s claims over Somaliland, Djibouti would be challenging Somaliland’s aspiration for independence and its control over its territory.
In summary, according to the document, Djibouti’s actions represent inappropriate interference in the internal affairs of Somaliland, which violates key principles of international law and the African Union Charter, such as non-interference and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
the main violations of international and regional law by Djibouti according to this document are the following:
i. Violation of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States:
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter establishes the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.
1. The African Union Charter also enshrines the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States (Article 4(g)).
2. By supporting rebel groups and opposing the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia, Djibouti would be violating this fundamental principle.
ii. Violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somaliland:
1. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States is a basic principle of international law (UN Charter, Article 2(4)).
By backing Somalia’s claims over Somaliland, Djibouti would be challenging Somaliland’s aspiration for independence and its control over its territory.
iii. Failure to uphold the principle of self-determination of peoples:
1. The right to self-determination of peoples is enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 1(2)) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 20).
By opposing the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia and supporting groups that oppose Somaliland’s independence, Djibouti would be violating this right.
In summary, the actions of Djibouti described in the document appear to violate key principles of international and regional law, such as non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination of peoples.
Thanks for your consideration.
Dr. Abdi Abdillahi Hassan
