Addis Abeba – Relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have gone through at least two major episodic moments since the coming into 2018. The first is related to the tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, and its short-lived euphoria. As the Horn of Africa has historically accumulated unresolved grievances and contestations, the agreement was largely expected to herald a new chapter in the modern political history of the region. It was thought to usher healthy Ethio-Eritrean interstate relations, given almost three-decades-old mutual suspicions triggered by the 1998 border war that led to unresolved disputes, proxy wars, and diplomatic hostilities. Eritrea-Somalia relations have not been peaceful either. The Eritrean government has been accused of directly sponsoring the al-Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants in Somalia and has unresolved border issues with Djibouti.
The advent of the Abiy flabbergasted many observers and seemed to raise the bar of hope for the region. The tripartite coalition, largely perceived as spearheaded by Abiy, was then expected to chart a new path in the Horn. A joint declaration on comprehensive cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea was signed in Asmara, on September 5, 2018. In January 2020, leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia vowed to further deepen ties under what they called “Joint Plan of Action for 2020”. The joint action plan was aimed at focusing on two main and intertwined objectives of consolidating peace, stability and security as well as promoting economic and social development.
Unfortunately, what followed next in four years has resurrected and reified the decades-old mutual suspicions and political standoffs in the region. The two-year devastating war in the Tigray region and Ethiopia’s recent MOU with Somaliland constitute major events that have redefined the Horn of Africa in general and peace and security in the region in particular. Since the signing of the Pretoria agreement, Ethio-Eritrea relations have been, measured by all possible indicators of interstate relations, going south. Eritrea’s absence and/or denial of participation in the agreement, some allegedly “offensive” comments made by Ethiopian officials about accessing the Red Sea via Eritrea, claims that Isaias-led PDFJ is sponsoring proxy war in Ethiopia’s ongoing war, and others appear to reinstall the pre-Nobel deadlock.
Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland and the MOU signed on 1 January 2024 is the other major episodic moment with significant consequences. The MOU has the potential to weaken Ethio-Somalia relations in many ways. It certainly emboldened al-Shebab’s presence and influence in the Horn. Neighboring and non-African actors are redefining their moves and perhaps instrumentalizing this growing fiasco. Among others, Eritrea, Egypt, Türkiye, Europe, and the US are making tactical as well as strategic moves to secure their own needs in the region.
Nevertheless, the MOU appears to fulfill the mutual needs of Ethiopia and Somaliland. For Ethiopia, the deal would bring about two major benefits, and for another reason, it is unlikely to easily let it go. For one thing, the deal would secure Ethiopia’s commercial access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia has been a landlocked country since Eritrea’s independence. Under the deal, Somaliland would, for fifty years, lease 20 km of its coastline to Ethiopia. Second, Somaliland’s coastline would also make Ethiopia a naval power in the Red Sea area as Ethiopia plans to build a military base there. Third, although Ethiopia, Dubai’s DP World, and Somaliland signed a deal to develop and manage the port of Berbera in 2017, Ethiopia has reportedly lost its 19 percent share due to perhaps failing to fulfill the conditions required to complete the ownership deal. Consequently, having already lost the opportunity to access the Red Sea via peaceful means with Eritrea and the tripartite Berbera deal, Ethiopia is likely to be highly protective of any remaining opportunities that might provide access to the Red Sea or improve its maritime trade capabilities, as these are crucial for its economic and strategic interests.
In addition, although different in some ways, Ethiopia’s unflinching determination to pursue the construction of the GERD – a project contested for its political and developmental aspirations – might signal the possible course the MOU with Somaliland would likely take. If the MOU is successfully implemented, it is likely to bring about substantial economic and political benefits, as well as enhance Ethiopia’s relative standing in Africa in general and East Africa in particular. For Somaliland, Ethiopia would only need to officially recognize Somaliland, a process that has been frustrated by the international community for three decades.
However, Somalia rejected the deal and vehemently resisted any further progress. The immediate reaction to the deal came from the Somali government which viewed it as “an act of aggression against Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. Many countries of the world, including Egypt, the USA, and Turkey, came out and voiced their concern and expressed support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is, however, unclear whether these reactions constitute something consequential or diplomatic lip service.
In addition to diplomatic appeals to the international community, Somalia’s Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took a series of measures. Accusing Ethiopia of “bluntly interfering” in its internal affairs, it ordered the expulsion of Ethiopia’s ambassador and the closure of two consulates in Somalia. Hassan’s government also demanded all Ethiopian troops, both those who came under bilateral arrangements and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), to leave Somalia by the end of 2024. According to Somalia’s National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh-Ali, this was a move aimed at showing Somalia’s rejection of Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland.
Yet, the Somali Federal Government’s (SFG) approach to dealing with this dispute might not necessarily yield positive outcomes. Evidence snowballing in the days after the deal shows something to the contrary. If anything, the SFG’s (re)actions have been and will likely undermine SFG’s and partners’ efforts against al-Shabaab in the Horn. Following the signing of the MOU, it was not only the SFG that outrightly condemned the deal but also al-Shabaab. In its press release rejecting the MOU, al-Shabaab has drawn a close parallel between Ethiopia’s part in the MOU and the historical crusaders. Al-Shabaab’s press release reads:
Harakat Al-Shabab Al Mujahideen (HSM) unequivocally rejects the proposal, entertainment, and submission of one inch of Somalia territory or coastline to the Ethiopian Christian crusaders. The Jihad waged by our forefathers, the likes of Ahmed Gurey, Hasan Barsane, and Syid Muhammad Abdullah Hasan, have previously prevented Ethiopia from actualizing its goals in the Horn of Africa, and by the grace of Allah, HSM will continue their legacy of fighting the Ethiopian crusaders and defending their religion, land, dignity, and resources (Al-Shabaab, press release, 18 October 2023).
Instrumentalizing this, Al-Shabaab is now undertaking a massive propaganda campaign against Ethiopia and recruiting individuals, Ethiopians included, for a new round of terrorist acts in the region. It’s not only the forceful emergence of al-Shabaab but also the already weak SFG that can further complicate security and political challenges in the Horn. It was noted elsewhere that Somalia’s national army suffers from “poor military strategy, inexperienced field commanders and corruption among leadership, including theft of food rations, military equipment, weapons and ammunition to sell on the black market”. Given, therefore, the already weak and incoherent military capability of the SFG and the ongoing propaganda campaign, al-Shabaab is poised to gather more strength, further weaken the SFG and continue attacking neighboring countries, and consequently, turn the region into a convenient site of fragile and failed states.
In any case, unlike SFG’s demand, it’s unclear if and when or even necessary that Ethiopia’s forces leave Somalia. Given security and political interests -including individuals, political groups, or otherwise, Ethiopian forces may not consider leaving Somalia. Measured by the analysis of possible outcomes, Ethiopia’s presence might rather be functional for both countries. The potential withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would create a conducive environment for al-Shabaab to expand operations beyond central and southern Somalia. In both case scenarios, Somalia needs another mechanism of pressuring Ethiopia and/or Somaliland to abandon their planned joint ventures.
Turkey seems to be actively working to bring about a peaceful – or at least non-confrontational – way out of this deadlock. Turkey’s involvement can be justified because it aims to protect its existing political and economic interests or expand on its “strategic depth” (popularized by Türkiye’s former Prime Minister-turned opposition leader Ahmet Davutoğlu) and presence, or both in the Horn of Africa. If successful, Turkey’s actual involvement can result in two possible logical outcomes. One is the de-escalation of diplomatic tension between the two countries. Turkey can facilitate direct talks and mutual understanding. This can reduce and prevent potential escalation of unilateral actions by the contending actors.
The first round of talks held in Türkiye’s capital, Ankara, signaled hopes in this direction. Ethiopia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs apprised the meeting as “friendly and transparent”. However, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said, “There are no indications so far that they [Ethiopia] are turning back from that path”. Nevertheless, another round of discussion is scheduled to take place on the upcoming September 2024 in Ankara. Still, if Addis Abeba and Hargeisa insist on implementing the MOU, Türkiye’s leverage can only be on mitigating conditions and factors, helping contending actors accept the inevitable with minor frictions.
It’s, however, unclear if Somalia would take such an outcome easily, and if it does not, in what ways. Another challenge is the fact that Somaliland does not seem to be actively participating in this Türkiye-led discussion. Understandably, this could have agitated Somalia, as it would mean the de facto recognition of the country and, consequently, its deal with Ethiopia. Yet, as an indispensable piece of the puzzle, Türkiye will have to find some innovative ways to involve Somaliland. Finally, any missteps, miscalculations, or mishandling can have immense ramifications for all the parties involved.
